

February 18, 2008

A-Nuc\proliferation\ draft outline

--(prior draft) Chinese test, October 1964. JTM tells of Indian request for help with a quick nuclear explosion of their own, perhaps by our giving them a bomb.

[NOTE: which was not fulfilled at the time: QUESTION: What DID Rusk and the USG do for India in 1964-68 in response to their request and their concern about the Chinese bomb? Help them with a nuclear program? How? Was this the beginning an Indian program, or only the acceleration of it? ASK Perkovich.

Note that Indian demands for implementation of Article VI in the NPT—which were foreshadowed by the Gilpatric Report in early 1965—were not met, either, in 1968-71. I.e., the US did not constrain itself, in the way that Gilpatric Committee had foreseen would be necessary to get INDIA, specifically, to accept an NPT and refrain from proliferation. [ The same failure by the US in 1995 led directly to the renewal by India of hot-testing in 1998, perhaps of an H-bomb, which may have fizzled.] So India not only failed to get, e.g., a NFU pledge, in 1968-69, but India was actually subjected to a US FU threat in 1971! (Probably this would not have occurred under Humphrey or LBJ: in fact, certainly not.]

The first Indian test was in 1974: what triggered it then? Aha: Nixon/HAK nuclear threat in 1971, sending U.S.S. Enterprise (??) into Bay of Bengal during India-PAKISTAN war, in which we sided with the (genocidal) Pakistanis, against Indian intervention aimed at

stopping a tide of refugees into India from Bangla Desh. Effect of splitting Pakistan. Nixon rationale/cover for intervention: to deter Indian invasion of West Pakistan (never contemplated?) which might bring in Chinese, perhaps trigger Chinese-Russian war?) He also wanted to help Pakistan, which had been intermediary in arranging the HAK visit to Beijing in June, 1971. (Was this really necessary or important?)

NOTE: this same defeat of Pakistan by India triggers determination by Bhutto the next month, January 1972, that if India gets a bomb, Pakistan must have a bomb. According to Levy, he summons scientists and demands a bomb within three years. (Impossible: especially by PU route). (Actually, Pakistan later (?) decides that it must have a bomb for FU in any case, to deter or respond to an Indian conventional invasion that would further split Pakistan in two.

How does an Indian bomb radically change the equation, the threat from India, which is far superior in conventional force? On the contrary, an Indian bomb simply lowers the credibility of Pakistani FU, though not to zero: Pakistan can still threaten a suicidal attack, in response to an Indian attack that threatens or destroys Pakistani “integrity” (as did actually happen in 1971, with no bomb on either side. If Pakistan had had a bomb THEN, it might have prevented this. The US threat of FU—essentially the same threat, but from the US—would not have been necessary.

At that point, however, the US did, in effect, successfully extend a “nuclear umbrella,” a FU threat to protect (what remained of Pakistan, West Pakistan). (NOTE: Pakistanis,

according to Adrian Levy, later referred to their own bomb as their nuclear umbrella: over themselves.) This is what Nixon intended and believed he had achieved. It was truly successful only if India had, in fact, considered or intended a full invasion of Pakistan, which did not occur. Is there any reason to believe that this was in store, otherwise? Admiral RamDas (at the symposium of the Toda Foundation, NAPF) told me, as I recall, that he was himself on a ship that was ordered not to provoke the Enterprise, to turn back; but that there had been no intent to invade West Pakistan. CHECK)

[QUESTIONS: Did Pak perceive US deployment of Enterprise as a US nuc threat? Did they fear an Indian attack on West Pakistan? Did they then perceive the US nuc threat as successful? Was this perceived success a factor in their decision to get their own bomb, on an accelerated schedule? –which leads to role of AQ Khan.

Did India perceive this as a threat? (Yes, according to Ramdas). Did it push them towards a hot test? (How far along was their nuclear program already? See Perkovich: ASK. )

Thus, this was another case of Nixon/HAK's deliberate FU threats. Moreover, it was a member of the smaller class of threats that the president believed had been successful. It MAY have been a rare case of a threat that actually WAS successful.

(But note its consequences! Both an Indian test, and an accelerated, "secret" Pakistani race for a bomb! The former occurs in 1974, with a Pakistani cold test in 1983 and then

proxy hot test in 1984(in China: compare the Israeli test in 1979 with South African help, and perhaps the French use of the US underground site in 1963-64).



[MEANWHILE, NOTE: Effects of secrecy: i.e. of policies that demand secrecy, and the actions needed to preserve secrecy, and the internal bureaucratic responses to secrecy:

The secret US “tilt” toward (genocidal) Pakistan reflected in the FU threat (which has also to be kept secret from the public) is leaked to Jack Anderson by Yeoman Radford.

Radford had already had been spying on HAK for the Chairman of the JCS, Adm.

Moorer: because Moorer had been cut out of the secret negotiations with China in 1971.

The plumbers—Krogh (who refuses to carry out an illegal wiretap, then Young, who agrees)—are brought in to investigate the leak to Anderson. Young uncovers the CJCS spying program; but Nixon does not punish either Radford or Moorer, because he wants to preserve the “secret channel” between HAK and Moorer, cutting out Laird: because Nixon wants to be able to order Moorer to carry out escalations against North Vietnam which Laird opposes. The discovery of Moorer’s “treachery”/spying gives Nixon, he feels, additional leverage on Moorer, reason to trust him as, in effect, a covert operator within the DOD.

But Young’s knowledge of this “bureaucratic crime” gives Nixon an additional reason to want to keep the existence of the plumbers secret, when the Cubans are found in the Watergate. Nixon tells various people (Ehrlichman?) that he doesn’t want Hunt to talk to a grand jury about his previous White House crimes/operations, because that would reveal the existence of the Plumbers, which would in turn “endanger the special channel”

between the White House and the JCS; i.e. it would challenge him to discipline Moorer, once it was revealed that Young had been in a “stopping leaks” mode (originally against me: then, especially Krogh, against the source of the SALT leak in July, 1971) and that he had been used to investigate a leak and had discovered an “internal leak” from the NSC to Moorer! Thus, it was important that Hunt and Liddy not implicate Krogh and Young, not only because this would point to the President’s actions against me, but because it might reveal Moorer’s actions against HAK!

And Nixon was still using this “special channel” (different term for it?) He was conducting secret attacks within North Vietnam: which actually led to breakdown of the secret “negotiations.” The fact that he, through Moorer and Gen. L in SVN, was actually attacking NVN at this time was also a sensitive secret from Congress, which had to be protected. (Thus, not only the existence of the channel to Moorer had to be kept secret—to keep it usable--but the actual use made of it had to be secret; and, then, its consequences, in breaking the negotiations.)

This was an additional reason why the president had to implicate himself in obstruction of justice by paying off Hunt to keep him quiet about his work for the White House before Watergate. And once revealed by Dean, that eventually brought him down: given that Butterfield revealed the existence of the tapes, and the Supreme Court ruled against the White House’ “executive privilege” (and Nixon shrank from destroying the tapes or defying the Court). Which, given Congress’ cut-off of funds, reflecting the antiwar movement (and the PP) made the war endable by a NVN offensive, in the absence of the

airpower that Nixon and HAK and Thieu had all expected to be available for the defense of ARVN.

All these are among the consequences/costs of secret policies and the generally-reliable secrecy system that makes them possible and makes possible Lying in State (my seminar in 1970). They also exemplify "State Secrets." The kind that make secret foreign policy possible, despite or and/or in subversion of "democracy," and with all its dangers: of detachment from reality, infeasibility or unrecognized risks, immorality. (along with the benefits to rulers that they perceive exclusively: freedom from controversy or opposition, ability to satisfy personal/special interest goals that are not acknowledged to the public, ability to pursue and perhaps achieve outcomes that public fears or "irrelevant concerns" would make unattainable if the policy and all its means had to be public. Elite education and on-the-job training alerts elites only to these benefits—and their corollary, the dangers, costs and impracticality of open policy-making or democracy—not to the dangers.]

To start again:

(prior draft): India asks for help with a nuclear explosion in 1964, after Chinese test.

(MY REVELATION). Rusk had decided to give it, and McNamara accepted this. We deputies to JTM argue to reverse this decision, with apparent success: the Gilpatric Committee is formed to examine U.S. policy.

Seaborg later (in his memoir) confirms exactly the attitude, indeed, the words, we had heard reported of Rusk: "If our enemies have the bomb, why shouldn't our friends have it?" And he confirms what we were told, that he extended this to Japan, Germany.

[RECALL: Flashback: JFK and Bowie exchange in 1961, MY REVELATION, wrt France and GERMANY. Then, MY REVELATION, JFK reversal of policy in November, 1963.

Moreover, Seaborg reveals that this openness toward proliferation by our friends is regarded by McGeorge Bundy as a super-secret, "as explosive as an atom bomb."

Forty-four years later, we can see (partly with the current help of "Deception" with respect to Pakistan and perhaps Turkey, as revealed by Edmonds) that the pattern holds true and has been continuously in existence:

--(a) US public, declaratory policy has been continuously and emphatically opposed to all proliferation (beyond the initial five);

-- (b) High-level officials have been receptive, tolerant, or even supportive of "friendly" nations' nuclear weapons programs (not only of Israel);



--© Other officials, and some in Congress, putting high priority on preventing any proliferation, have opposed all instances of it (accepting the conclusions of the Gilpatric Committee, in effect), and opposed US support or tolerance of it;

--(d) the existence of this split, and the very existence of the attitudes of group (b), has been regarded as requiring great secrecy; and in fact, the secret has been very well kept for the entire period;

--(e) What has equally required secrecy, and achieved it throughout the period, is that the attitudes of the officials in (b) have **prevailed** over those of officials in group (c), with the adherence, for various reasons, of the president. To say the least, US policy has not consistently or determinedly or urgently been to obstruct or prevent proliferation by countries regarded as (at the time) friendly to US interests. It has regularly gone beyond that to be supportive of such proliferation, not merely "turning a blind eye" to it (the regular cover story, when this tolerance is noticed) but actually facilitating it in various ways and protecting it from discovery by Congressional opponents who might obstruct it or simply demand the enforcement of actual legislation prohibiting or sanctioning it.

--(f) Given the split in official attitudes, and the declaratory policy and the needs for secrecy—including secrecy from investigative agencies like the FBI or parts of CIA or committees of Congress--, and the attitudes of some in Congress (e.g. Senator Glenn) who oppose all proliferation (unless by Israel), there has been some inconsistency in policy, and some fluctuation over time. At various periods, some steps have been taken

to inhibit proliferation (or pretend to) by certain countries, including some, like Pakistan, that at other times or in other ways have been aided or permitted to proliferate.

--(g) This very fluctuation has encouraged countries like Pakistan not only to seek the bomb, rather than relying on American promises, but to seek sources of help other than American. Thus, when GHWB cut off aid to Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 (and aid to Afghanistan: both moves that fail to reflect the supposed perspicacity and long-range strategic thinking of aides like Scowcroft) , Zia and Khan in Pakistan seek help from China, along with the Saudis and Libya and North Korea, and sales to Iran: all cementing an enlarged "axis of evil" (in which GWB failed to include Pakistan, CHINA, or the Saudis, as proliferators, or, for that matter, supporters of terror! (Kashmir, Darfur, Pol Pot, 9-11, Taliban, Hamas...)

--(h) On the whole, the secret US action policy toward proliferation, in gross contradiction to its declaratory policy, has been supportive of it, facilitating it and protecting it from premature exposure and opposition. (This has required in particular secrecy from Congress: both from those who have legislated sanctions against it, and those who, not disapproving of the proliferation, wish to be lied to by the president and his aides so they will not be forced to approve the enforcement of sanctions which they don't want to oppose publicly). (See the challenge posed by, and the fates of, the whistle-blowers, Richard Barlow and Sibel Edmonds).

--(i) Above all, **no** administration has come close to accepting or implementing the chief conclusions of the Gilpatric Committee, that a requisite of preventing proliferation in the longer-run was real implementation of Article VI of the NPT (forced to be included in the NPT by the US by India, in particular!): i.e., a set of constraints on US and SU nuclear policy (and ultimately, all the NWS) that moved toward NFU and abolition of nuclear weapons, foregoing the continued **use** of nuclear weapons by the US both in NATO and elsewhere.

--(j) Thus, a belief by Nixon and Kissinger, and later by the neo-cons, that proliferation "could not" be prevented in the longer-run, that even widespread proliferation was **inevitable**, followed quite compellingly from their determination NOT to implement Article VI in any way. Whether the NPT had existed or continued to exist or not, **no** president from LBJ on was willing to take **any** of the steps with respect to restraining and reversing US nuclear posture and policy that Gilpatric correctly identified as **essential** prerequisites to preventing proliferation, to inducing other states to refrain from acquiring and using their own nuclear weapons.

Only under great grassroots pressure were presidents willing to concede one of these points, a comprehensive test ban (now rescinded, though not yet violated, under GWB). A public, international movement was spurred in the first instance by the direct, immediate effects on the public of the atmospheric testing. This focused public attention on the effects on the arms race of any testing, even underground, and kept alive the



possibility of popular, political pressure to end all testing, which was finally, and uniquely, effective.

(The only other measure that came close to achieving this popular “critical mass” was the freeze campaign, which was effectively countered by Reagan, except for intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which were actually abolished by virtue of the European movement and the desire of neo-cons to counter the US movement to freeze ICBMs. )

Similarly, the NIMBY factor—desire not to have nuclear targets in people’s own backyards—plus the recognition of total infeasibility of an effective shield against a Soviet first-strike, i.e. a boondoggle project in terms of its **declared** objectives, kept a lid on ABM expenditures. (Again, some in Congress and the public were led to recognize the contribution of an ABM to the arms race, given its first-strike “benefits.”)

--(j) An upshot of these patterns has been a long sequence of apparent (misleading) “intelligence failures” in appreciating the scale and pace, or even existence, of various proliferating nuclear programs, or of hot testing. Supposed “surprises” keep recurring: the Israeli program, and later its scale (till Vanunu); the Indian program, test in 1974, and especially, testing in 1998; the South African program; Israeli test off South Africa; the Pakistani sales program (QUESTION: Does US intelligence really not know what, or to whom, the Pakistanis (“Khan”) gave to countries beyond Libya, Iran and North Korea? E.g., Saudis (Levy claims they gave nuclear warheads for missiles!); TURKEY? (never



mentioned, either as conduit to Pakistan—Edmonds claims—or as recipient!; Egypt? Syria? Al Qaeda: some contact known.)

In reality, every one of these (with possible exception of a real failure, to predict the Indian test, despite the warnings by the BJP, and expectations of much of the rest of the world!) was appreciated by the CIA and followed in some detail; and (the big secret) was **accepted by each president in turn as serving US interests on balance**, if only in terms of good relations with a country that was serving other US interests, or in terms that active or effective opposition or sanctions would hinder other US interests.

(E.g., admission of the North Korean program and focus on it with effective measures, or of the Iranian program revealed by MEK in 2002, would have undercut the exclusive USG focus on the supposed, actually non-existent, Iraqi program!)

In some cases, US attitudes toward programs that came later to seem problematic were earlier actually positive and facilitating: e.g. Iran's program under the Shah (helped both by the US and by Pakistan, and perhaps China); then, Saddam Hussein's program, seen as a counter to Iran! (Was Iraq helped by Pakistan, in the '80's?!) Israel's program, obviously, including French and British direct help. South Africa?

Like the US unwillingness to constrain itself, even by the NPT Article VI, unwillingness to accept mutual constraints with the SU or other NWS, its aid to or permissive attitude toward proliferation among friends—starting with Israel, but including India, Pakistan and others (was the South African program known more widely?)—appeared blatantly

hypocritical, depriving the US of any moral suasion or authority in this sphere, any possibility of effective US “leadership” in averting proliferation, and depriving “non-proliferation” of any status as a universal **norm**. And continued US FU threats actually provoked proliferation (as, by the SU, China, India, North Korea, Iran) and encouraged it (including for prestige purposes) by example, or by desire to influence US/NATO policy (either in carrying out or in refraining from FU threats, or in assuring US non-nuclear support: see UK, France, Israel, Pakistan). Thus, US policy has consistently enhanced the perceived *usefulness* of nuclear weapons to other nations (while only partially, spasmodically, selectively, acting to discourage their acquisition).

Indeed, the usefulness for prestige and national self-esteem has been universally felt and appreciated (just as in the US), in every one of the NWS (making it virtually unthinkable, for domestic political reasons, for any one of the NWS to rid itself of nuclear weapons once acquired and tested. None has come close to considering this.) And the usefulness for deterrence has seemingly been frequently demonstrated by others. SU and China vs. the US; Pakistan vs. India; Israel vs. Egypt (not totally, but restraining Egyptian attack in 1967 and 1973); North Korea since testing; and, negatively, by the inability of non-nuclear Iraq to deter US invasion, or Iran to deter US threats.

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